Georgia needs to make mutually exclusive choices and commit to playing a role in the Caucasus.
Geography provided Georgia with a range of opportunities limited by size, location, and history. Tbilisi did exploit the opportunities afforded by a period of globalization and U.S. hegemony, redefining the capacity of the state. The country assumed the role of a facilitator between regional partners. Not long ago, Tbilisi was where most Armenian and Azerbaijani negotiators convened. There are fewer reservations now. Given the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia became the sole conduit of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and, thereon, the EU. No major logistics project in the region was conceivable without Georgia’s access to the sea and open borders. This was coupled with market access, as Georgia signed Free Trade Agreements with China, the United States, and an Association Agreement with the EU. Georgia’s location allowed it to play the role of a mediator, a service hub, and an anchor of western interests. That is no longer the case.
By making the choice to reap the short-term benefits of becoming a conduit for Russian logistics during the war in Ukraine, to enable an offshore data economy, and become a financial backdoor to international markets, Tbilisi has favoured a small elite at the expense of its regional role. For the first time in a generation, Yerevan is closer to Brussels than Tbilisi, even if Georgia has spent decades developing a normative and economic infrastructure that is unparalleled in the region. While pipelines will continue to transit via Georgia, strategic investment on the Georgian grid and logistics infrastructure entails political risk that multilateral banks are unlikely to take, in the West, or will charge dearly for in the East. The notion that Georgia can keep its options open and play a multivector game is reflective of a megalomania.
Geography limits options. Estonia managed to widen its options because it borders some of the most competitive economies in the world that hold no territorial ambitions over it, with one significant exception. Because Tallinn secured early entry in the EU and NATO, it is circumventing the crushing asymmetry of a small state. An early investment in technology and a competitive regulatory environment maximised the impact of these choices. Georgia pursued similar strategies, making the most of globalisation. Now, there is a de-globalisation trend. Estonia meets this challenge from within the Single Market and with the protection afforded to EU member states, through enhanced regionalisation.
Location might be an advantage Georgia has overplayed. As of recent, Georgia has had the confidence to navigate among great powers as if there is nothing to be learned from the interwar period and the First Republic. The government is geared to politically support de-globalisation and a sovereigntist approach made in Budapest or Bratislava, without EU or NATO membership. While the political rationale is in tune with political trends elsewhere in the West, Georgia forgets that small states in a sovereigntist system dominated by bilateral relations are crushed by asymmetry. With access to the Single Market, guaranteed foreign direct investment, freedom of travel, and Article V guarantees, certain leaders can do and say what Georgian leaders cannot afford to because they have none of these things. Substantive sovereignty requires competitive advantages such as rare resources, technological levers, market access, and strong legal institutions. That is what makes Estonia, Switzerland, Norway, Luxembourg, Slovenia, powers that punch above their weight. Georgia has location. Is that enough?
Small states pool together regional resources and the harness regional value chains and collective defence. Think of Scandinavia, the Benelux, or the Swiss Confederation. Sovereign states without qualitative advantages and regional allies that play a multivector game crush under the weight of their megalomania. Put simply, the world does not care whether Georgia supports de-globalisation or not. For Moscow, the South Caucasus is not a normal neighbourhood but a zone of historical entitlement and strategic depth. Significantly, Georgia is no longer the backwater of a former Empire but the heart of a logistical artery it needs. It is fanciful to think that Tbilisi will tame Moscow’s demands by being useful. Being useful to both Moscow and the EU entails a contradiction that is becoming increasingly untenable. China is a merchant nation. It’s interests are logistical. Georgia is a route that connects Central Asia and Western Europe. Rerouting is possible, particularly if Georgia does not play its role and begins to lose market access. Being useful to China without being useful to the EU is untenable. In sum, Georgia needs to ask “what is location good for?”
Turkey offers a defence, logistics, and resource extraction partnership; the EU has engaged Georgia as a perspective member state of its Single Market, its travel and education area, and does offer a range of security partnerships. That is less than Article V guarantees but it’s the best Georgia can do. Between Ankara and Brussels, Georgia could find the makings of a regionalisation policy. Indeed, this has been the narrative of successive governments. Location is no doubt a critical resource, but if Georgia wants to play a role than it needs to commit to everything that makes the country useful. Not committing means the country is less relevant.
Turkey has created a top-down ecosystem of defence and economic cooperation. Relations are framed transactionally. For Ankara, Tbilisi was always a match maker, facilitating access and convening stakeholders. Within a broader framework of trusted partners, Tbilisi still has a role to play. The European Union represents a different kind of strategic geography. Its terrain is legal, institutional, and normative. Its concept of stability is procedural: rule of law, independent courts, accountable governance, and market alignment. Georgia was for decades Europe’s anchor in the region, a normative, economic, political, and logistical bridge. Between Ankara and Brussels, Georgia could find a regional role. The question is not membership of clubs but defining a role in a new regional system. Being useful is being relevant.
A new system will emerge with or without Georgia. Georgia cannot engage in the ‘art of the deal.’ Put simply, Tbilisi is instrumental to its partners or fails to be. Whatever the “multivector” paradigm pretends to be, it is not realistic. If Georgia punches above its weight consistently, then Georgia will get bruised.
Tedo Japaridze is a former ambassador to the US and ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Currently he is Vice-Chairman of Anaklia Development Consortium.
Ilya Roubanis is a journalist, a member of the editorial team of Caucasus Watch and an Area Studies Analyst and Senior Fellow with the Institute of International Affairs in Athens.
