Peace in the Russia–Ukraine war does not yet seem close, but neither is it impossibly distant. It is clear that Russia will, for some time, continue its efforts to achieve its maximalist goals in this war.
However, the serious difficulties now visible in Russia’s economy and financial system are steadily reducing Moscow’s ability to continue the war for much longer. In particular, the sanctions imposed by the United States on Rosneft and Lukoil, together with the European Union and the United Kingdom tightening their own sanctions, will further aggravate the already severe problems within Russia’s economy. Ukraine’s growing long-range strikes deep into Russian territory are also becoming increasingly painful and costly for Moscow.
By 2026, President Putin will face a difficult dilemma. Either he will have to order another and much larger mobilization to achieve his declared goals (cutting almost all non-military expenditures and moving the economy entirely onto a war footing) or he will have to agree to President Trump’s proposed compromise peace based on mutual concessions. With that said however, the present international environment allows Russia to end the war without its army and economy being destroyed, without suffering strategic defeat, and while keeping control over occupied territories.
This would allow Putin’s authoritarian regime, which fully controls the media, to present the result at home as a victory.
As long as the international situation allows Russia to leave the Ukraine war without total defeat, the Russian leadership’s narrative will not change. After the fighting stops, they will still claim that they punished Ukraine, that they liberated Donbas despite the “collective West’s” full support for Kyiv, that they built a multipolar world order, and that they increased Russia’s global influence and prestige. Clearly, this policy will make the continuation of expansionism in Russian foreign affairs very likely.
Keeping imperial ambitions and great-power rhetoric alive will, on one hand, force the Russian leadership to continue expanding its “sphere of influence” even after the war in Ukraine ends. On the other hand, they will also realize that the “victory” they are presenting tof their people is an illusion. In reality, the war in Ukraine has greatly weakened Russia: both militarily and economically. Its main rivals, NATO and the European Union, have become more united and significantly stronger. For this reason, however adventurous Russia’s leaders may be, they will likely understand and accept that a real war with NATO or the EU would end in disaster for Russia itself.
Therefore, at the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s leaders will likely turn their expansionist attention toward their non-NATO neighbors—the strategically important states of the South Caucasus.
Among these states, Russia enjoys the most popular support in Armenia. And Moscow has long wanted to overthrow the Pashinyan government but has so far failed. Yet once the war in Ukraine ends and Russia’s resources are freed, the situation could change. It is difficult to predict exactly how.
In Azerbaijan and Georgia, popular support for Russia is very limited. However, the existence of authoritarian regimes in both countries make them vulnerable to Russian pressure. These regimes weaken democratic and civic institutions and, through repression, reduce their peoples’ ability to resist external threats. At the same time, by blocking integration with Euro-Atlantic structures and blocs, they deprive their countries of the strong backing that Western alliances could provide. Consequently, the existence of authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan and Georgia leaves them weak in the face of Russian expansionism.
The United States and Europe must recognize that the South Caucasus is likely to become the next target of Russian expansion. This is a strategically vital region—stretching along the Middle Corridor that links Europe to China, situated between Russia and Iran, and connecting Europe with the resource-rich and strategically important lands of Central Asia. The West must not allow this region to become the next victim of Russian aggression.
The independence and self-defense capacities of the states of South Caucasus must be strengthened now, and achieving their integration into European space should be one of the West’s priority goals.
With all that said however, it is also clear that as long as authoritarian rule continues in Azerbaijan and Georgia, true European integration will not be possible. Therefore, preventing the inclusion of the South Caucasus into Russia’s sphere of influence depends directly on the democratization of these states.
The United States and Europe must urgently use all available means of influence to ensure that Ilham Aliyev and Bidzina Ivanishvili open the way for genuine democratic reforms in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Only through such reforms can these nations resist Russia’s renewed expansion after the war in Ukraine.
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The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Democracy & Freedom Watch.
Amnesty International has issued this statement regarding the detention of Mr Karimli.
